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are two additional essays (Sartre and the problem of other minds, and 
O’Shaughnessy on non-conscious contributions to experience) of lesser 
appeal. If a major section reflecting on contemporary philosophy credibly 
has “Humanity” in its title, both Williams and Wiggins deserve both in-
clusion and praise. With Williams, one finds the ideal antagonist, the tutor 
with all the right and challenging questions, all the supple and adaptable 
reflexes that a life in philosophy promises to cultivate—but rarely does. 
To be the joyful victim of his insightful criticisms is to earn an enduring 
debt. David Wiggins, to those who know him well, thinks of issues with 
what is best described as purity—all contaminants removed, the essence 
now reduced and rendered all the more fortifying. The point of contact 
reached in the ethical works of Williams and Wiggins is actually lived life, 
in its complexity, its resistance to formula, its vexing ability to outfox the 
apparatus of the school room. Many, this reviewer among them, require 
more of morality than Williams allows or Wiggins supplies. Yet, it is in 
this that they stand as moral teachers, insisting that others now present 
arguments supporting any claim to be seeing more.
Nagel has given readers a nice sample of his thinking on matters large 
and not so large. As with any work in this genre, it is less a book than a col-
lection of outlines for books the author has written or clearly could write. 
Nagel is controlled in his passions, teasingly unsuccessful in attempts to 
conceal his prejudices—his temperament. He never does reach a fuller un-
derstanding of that religious temperament that might be rightly paired 
with secular philosophy, nor does he test with judicious disinterest the 
temperament that marks out the secular. But good questions are raised 
and useful hints provided. There will be more from Thomas Nagel, and it 
will be welcome.
Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity, by Nelson Maldonado- 
Torres. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008. Pp. xvi + 342. $84.95 
(cloth), $23.95 (paper).
TIMOTHY PAUL ERDEL, Bethel College, Indiana
Nelson Maldonado-Torres draws on the works of Emmanuel Levinas, 
Frantz Fanon, and Enrique Dussel, who “make explicit the subtle com-
plicities between dominant [Eurocentric] epistemological and anthro-
pological ideals and the exercise of violence” (237). The general notion 
seems to be that when autonomous individuals (monads, transcendental 
egos, or the like) undertake epistemology as the quest for the knowledge 
of objects, then the resulting focus on the ontology of things inevitably 
denigrates the subjective Other. When epistemology and metaphysics 
trump ethics, human relations become secondary. Thus it is no accident 
that cogito ergo sum emerged in the immediate wake of ego conquiro. The 
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unknown, unimportant Other is assumed to be sub-human and merely 
fit for conquest. “Western humanism argued for the glory of Man and 
the misery of particular groups of human beings simultaneously. Indeed, 
Man became the most glorious as he was able to claim relative indepen-
dence from God and superiority over the supposedly less than human 
others at the same time” (238). What follows is just a smattering of points 
from the occasionally dense and complex arguments that support the 
foregoing claims.
Nietzsche asserted that “the normal state of things is war” (32), and 
“War and courage accomplish many more great things than love of neigh-
bor” (33, speaking through Zarathustra). Maldonado-Torres traces the 
continental line from Hegel on through phenomenology, existentialism, 
and various modes of Critical Theory in order to explore the implications 
of Nietzsche’s dictums. He is especially interested in drawing corrective 
insights from a Lithuanian-French Jew (Levinas), from an Afro-Caribbean 
atheist (Fanon), and from a Latin American Catholic (Dussel), who each 
develop their philosophical critiques from the underside of modernity. 
The author himself is thereby presenting a “de-colonial ethic” to expose 
the European penchant for war, conquest, and domination.
For Levinas, philosophy—the “wisdom of love” rather than the “love of 
wisdom”—is primarily “a response to the cries of injustice” (83). Europe-
an history makes him suspicious of grand intellectual claims for European 
thinkers. The year 1492 recalls twin evils, the expulsion of the Jews and 
Muslims from Spain and the bloody conquest of the Americas (85). French 
revolutionaries’ calls for liberty, equality, and fraternity ring hollow given 
subsequent anti-Semitism in France, if the three ideals were even compatible 
in the first place (71, 73). Husserl may be skeptical of naturalism, posi-
tivism, and psychologism, but he is not skeptical enough. The true phi-
losopher should be skeptical of Western paradigms that privilege “conflict 
and violence” and that “climax in racism and genocide” (83). Nietzsche, 
whether he intended to or not, did indeed, by embracing the will to power, 
provide a foundation for Hitlerism (29–35).
Levinas, as interpreted by Maldonado-Torres, reserves a special scorn 
for Heidegger. It is not just a matter of his affiliation with the Nazi regime 
and his ignoble deeds during that era. Nor was it even the infamous 1966 
Der Spiegel interview, where Heidegger’s pointed silence about and appar-
ent indifference to the Shoah betrayed his enduring complicity with evil. 
Rather, Heidegger’s basic theme of being-unto-death exposes his own 
narcissism and moral blindness. For Heidegger may be deeply concerned 
with his own death, but he shows no regard for the unjust deaths of in-
numerable others (78).
Levinas instead proposes that Eros responds to death with the possibility 
of fecundity (66–69), “to the point of legitimating problematic views about 
sexuality and the family” (77). For the author is quick to disassociate himself 
from politically incorrect implications. “Masculinist and heteronormative 
bias are clearly evinced in Levinas. In this respect, one needs to maintain 
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a critical distance from him” (66). The author further notes that ideology 
of war is typically “masculine”—killing men, raping women, and rejecting 
homosexuals (73). Still, Levinas is correct to give priority to the ethical. 
“The ethical attitude shows itself most clearly wherever the anguish of 
murdering the Other or the scandal of the Other’s death is heavier than the 
fear of one’s own death or finitude, which is different from authenticity and 
more profound than solidarity or companionship” (84).
The youthful revolts of May 1968 pointed to ills that had given Europe 
what Levinas called its “bad conscience.” But Fanon focuses on a deeper 
hypocrisy. The author comments, “It was in relation to its colonies that the 
liberal (not the Hitlerian) Europe showed its darkest face—to the point 
where talking about Europe’s ‘bad conscience,’ from such a perspective, 
would have appeared ridiculous” (89). Fanon reverses Hegel’s analysis 
of master-slave relations. “In an Imperial World, lordship is the position 
of a privileged self that does not even turn toward the slave to achieve 
recognition. The reason for this is that in this context the slave is not rec-
ognized as an other” (106). Feuerbach’s insights are also given a new twist 
by Fanon. “In an Imperial context one never finds God, but rather the God 
of the master or the God of the slave” (112). The logic of Imperial man is 
deadly. “At the end, narcissism becomes homicidal, and the command, 
‘Thou shalt not kill’ is transformed into a project of identity based on the 
principle, ‘I kill, therefore I am” (114).
Once nation-states are organized, imperialism discards religion in 
favor of other forms of self-justification, first “eugenics, phrenology, and 
the social sciences,” then “conservatism and neoliberalism, with their re-
spective beliefs in the preservation of the system or the sustained increase 
of the market, offer justification to sacrificial modes of relations that assure 
the position of the master as the one and only lord” (119). After “‘the death 
of God,’ . . . economy becomes the new theology,” so that ultimately “the 
life and hunger of millions sustain an inhuman system unconditionally 
defended by an imperial humanity” (119–120). It is at this juncture that 
Maldonado-Torres pauses momentarily to reference Karl Barth, Stanley 
Hauerwas, and John Howard Yoder in a footnote, with a passing admission 
that “sometimes the affirmation of the transcendence of God animates 
criticism of racism and imperialism” (120).
Fanon applauds Hegel’s insight, contra Machiavelli and Hobbes, that 
self-recognition is more important than self-preservation, but laments that 
Hegel soon abandoned it in quest of Geist, the philosophy of conscious-
ness, and similar “ontological fantasies” (125–126). Recognition, which 
Fanon pursues, comes in three spheres, namely, love, rights, and social es-
teem. The author recalls a quotation from Che Guevara, “Let me say at the 
risk of seeming ridiculous that the true revolutionary is guided by great 
feelings of love” (122). But colonialism crushes all distinctions between or 
any possibility of the foregoing triad, so Lewis Gordon observes that “it is 
an extraordinary affair for a black person to be ordinary” (127). Or again, 
from early in Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, “However painful it may be 
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for me to accept this conclusion, I am obliged to state it: For the black man 
there is only one destiny. And it is white” (131). One of Fanon’s great in-
sights as a psychiatrist was that psychoanalysis could not explain or cure 
the pathology of colonized subjects apart from sociogeny. Beginning with 
the subheading, “The Cry and the Gift of Self,” there follows an extended 
meditation growing out of the question, “What is it that the black wants?” 
(130–159), which I found the most moving and compelling section of the 
book. In the process the author skewers Hegel for his glorification of war, 
especially his claim that “civilized nations” are entitled to treat nations 
that are less advanced as barbarians (145–146).
Dussel offers a phenomenology of “I conquer.” He points out that, “For 
colonized and racialized peoples identity is always contested, since it is 
tied to a power structure and an imaginary that militates against their 
very existence” (189). The insights the author draws can be biting. “‘Kill-
ability’ and ‘rapability’ are inscribed into the images of colonial bodies and 
deeply mark their ordinary existence” (220).
Dussel also presents, especially in his Frankfurt lectures, the notion of 
“transmodernity” (first mentioned by the author on p. 12, but not really 
explained until p. 228). Transmodernity is characterized by three trajecto-
ries. 1) It interrogates links between philosophical projects and geopoliti-
cal positioning. 2) It understands that the liberation of colonies is as impor-
tant as, say, the French Revolution. 3) It assumes that critical philosophy 
will take as its horizon the vast majority of struggling peoples around the 
world. The author goes on to suggest that transmodernity should bring 
together the best of three grand enterprises—modernity, post-modernity, 
and the southern life-world. So transmodernity emphasizes the polygen-
esis of ideas, cultures, communications, and theories. It is the unfinished 
project of de-colonization.
Thus “Levinas, Fanon, and Dussel provide examples of the complex 
itinerary of philosophers whose work intersects in Europe but can hardly 
be reduced to European premises, experiences, histories, or epistemolo-
gies” (234). The author does admit, however, that each of the three prom-
ised more than they delivered (235).
The author’s conclusion provides an excellent summary, but also his 
hopes for moving beyond the paradigms of war, saying that the positive 
thrust of his work provides “an alternative vision of the human and a 
different conception of peace” (238). There is also a repeated evocation of 
Don Quixote near the end, a not uncommon move among Spanish think-
ers (Maldonado-Torres hails from Puerto Rico). He moves toward his final 
thoughts. “Love, once again, appears as a response to war” (151). But it is 
important to note that “love is interpreted here as a de-colonizing activ-
ity” (151) and that both “de-colonial love and justice commence in the 
attention paid to the ‘cries’ of ethical revolt that emerge at the very limits 
of Being” (152).
There is much more one might try to elucidate than limited space will 
allow. I conclude with a few of my own brief observations.
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There is no real engagement with the teachings of Jesus. For example, 
the extended analysis of the Other never mentions something so basic as 
the Golden Rule. The closest we come is the one stray reference to Barth, 
Hauerwas, and Yoder.
Levinas fought against the Germans, Fanon against the French, while 
Dussel is a philosopher of liberation. It is not clear that any of them (or the 
author) really repudiates violence, just violence from the wrong sources in 
pursuit of the wrong causes. As a pacifist, I am interested in a fundamen-
tal critique of violence itself.
I am enough of a philosophical naïf that I would prefer to speak about 
issues directly rather than through the tortured language of post-Hegelian 
Critical Theory. To my mind, the author writes best when he does the same.
One wonders just whom it is this book was meant to persuade. Any 
reader with the time and sympathies to wade through it is not very likely 
to be active in the public arena where geopolitical decisions are made. Nev-
ertheless, I think that those who do will find their thinking enriched.
